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PARTIAL TRUTH TELLING IN THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: 
ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS AND EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS 
ABSTRACT 
Background X-ray volumetric imaging (XVI), the focus of a number of fund raising campaigns in the 
mid 2000’s, was introduced accompanied by a fanfare of newness and discourses of ‘hope’, 
‘inspiring clinical confidence’ and ‘accuracy’. The XVI, an imaging technology used in the delivery of 
Radiotherapy treatment, was incorporated into strategic planning priorities across the UK based on a 
rationale of self-evidence. During this time the way in which the new system was discussed with 
patients was variable. 
Research Objectives The purpose of this study was to uncover how experimental practices were 
embedded and enacted during the use of a new technological system, specifically relating to how 
patients were enrolled during introductory phases of technology adoption. 
Research design and context Drawing on ethnographic work and interviews with staff members in 
one hospital, the study examines staff discussions prior to the introduction of the XVI technology. It 
considers how staff views were at odds with practices that occurred once the system was in place 
during the ‘experimental’ stage of use with the XVI.  
Ethical Considerations Approval was obtained from Local NHS Research Ethics Committee and NHS 
Main Research Ethics Committee (REC 07/Q1308/16) for the interview and ethnographic stages 
respectively. All names have been changed and participants signed a consent form. 
Findings Staff reported a lack of evidence, absence of proof and perturbing doubts with the XVI. 
Both patients’ and practitioners’ partial understanding about the risks and benefits of the XVI system 
created incommensurable ideas regarding the use of the system and what the patients’ role was 
during these introductory stages.  
Conclusion Maintaining partial truth telling renders patients’ experiences of treatment at odds with 
‘experimental’ practice. This has wide reaching implications for practice. 
KEY WORDS 
Experimental Practices; Consent; Consent for Research; New Technologies; Truth-Telling. 
BACKGROUND 
Withholding truth from patients is a well-debated ethical concern within the medical profession. 
Tuckett 1 dates the rise of truth telling as a concept to the 1950’s following the 1947 Nuremberg trial 
where it was established that the Hippocratic view of the doctor-patient relationship, centred on 
beneficence, was insufficient to protect individuals from medical abuses, indicating the need to 
consent prior to medical procedures. Gillon 2, in a report to the BMJ, reported that it was Davidson, 
in 1957, who began the discussion regarding the likelihood of causing harm through prioritising 
honesty above information relating to a patient’s condition. Through these discussions, it was 
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suggested that withholding the truth could be seen as a mode of evading awkward or unpleasant 
responsibility.  
In literature reviewed by Tuckett 1, the view that truth telling is essential because it is an intrinsic 
good, was described along with the argument against truth telling based on the uncertainty 
principle. These arguments are well covered in the literature and are specifically used in debates 
over whether a patient would want to or should know the truth relating to diagnosis, usually 
terminal.3-5 The main arguments for deception or withholding information from patients are:  
• A doctor may add to a patient’s distress by telling them distressing news, thus adding to a 
patients problems; 
• That the truth cannot be communicated because a doctor is rarely, or never, in a position to 
know the truth or because a patient would rarely, if ever, be in a position to understand the 
truth; 
• That patients do not wish to be told the truth.2 
Pergert and Lutzen 6 have discussed the relationship of hope and truth telling (again in the context of 
the diagnosis with severely sick or end of life care). The authors assert that “healthcare staff protect 
themselves and others by balancing truth-telling with the aim of preserving hope.” However, when 
the truth is uncertainty, this balancing act is not specifically about preserving hope for the patient, 
rather it may be considered more a balancing of hope that practice can continue undisrupted. 
Balancing disclosure can thus be considered partial truth telling. 
Yet, ‘truth’ is a culturally constructed artefact. It is not a static object awaiting neutral discovery or 
delivery by a doctor to a patient.7 Pergert and Lutzen 6 define truth, in the context of truth telling, as: 
…the subjective truth; that is, what healthcare staff, out of their qualified judgement believe 
to and are convinced to be true.6 
If truth is constructed and subjective, it is possible, therefore, to create truth through the 
manipulation of information. As such, partial truth telling is a process of informational manipulation, 
the virtue of which, should be considered based on a practitioner’s special moral duties towards 
their subjects 8. Partial truth telling affects what a person believes and, as such, informational 
manipulation and the conditions of understanding are inextricably linked.9 Truth-telling is, therefore, 
a dynamic, iterative, and interactive process that takes place between practitioner and patient, 
sharing many provisional truths in view of a common therapeutic goal. It is related to the doctrine of 
informed consent,7 in that it relates to the ability of an individual to be in a position to give 
‘effective’ consent and the duty of disclosure.9 Effective decision making relies upon the 
practitioner’s duty to disclose facts necessary for ‘intelligent’ consent.  
One problem, of many problems, related to situated practices of truth telling occurs when there is 
uncertainty over practice, where risks are not ‘facts’, rather they are ‘perturbing doubts’. Telling the 
truth on uncertain territory can lead to a lack of confidence in practice or the need for 
overburdening of patients (and practitioners) with details, likelihoods, outcomes, alternatives and 
also speculation.  
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Surbone 7 states that one particular difficulty with telling the truth within an oncology context is, 
“avoiding therapeutic misconceptions in early-phase clinical trials” 7, indeed Lignou and Edwards 8 
describe how: 
…intentionally manipulating information can protect and secure a subject’s rights and at the 
same time benefit society. Moreover, we claim that manipulation of information may also 
affect a person’s desires to take part in a research without modifying or altering their beliefs 
and thus that a definition of manipulation of information broader than that found in the 
literature should be adopted.8 
One expects, however, that in a research context, a patient is aware of the context of uncertainty, 
the circumstance of experimentation. Early phase clinical trials have a formality associated with 
them – a rhetoric of hope but also a rhetoric of consent, eligibility and structure dictated by the 
Declaration of Helsinki 10 and Good Clinical Practice guidelines.11 In these contexts, truth telling is 
considered a universal principle or virtue – indeed, accepting doubt and uncertainty is often 
presented as the very basis of altruism in research – doing something unknown for true benefit of 
others.12, 13 
In this paper I aim to look at truth telling in experimental practices. For the purposes of the present 
paper, I am defining experimental practices as a practice under study or evaluation and an 
experimental subject as a person under study or evaluation. I use these terms over ‘research 
practice’ or ‘research subject’ as the categorisation of a practice as research initiates governance 
frameworks for regulation and safeguarding. I aim to consider how partial truth telling in such 
practices raises empirical ethical issues for practitioners, patients and researchers alike. I want to 
move away from truth telling and its associations with delivering diagnosis or prognosis and look at a 
much more applied, situated and empirical example of telling the truth to patients.  
Empirical ethics focuses on the ‘goods’ that carers and patients strive for, the values and norms they 
inexplicitly or explicitly shape and the ‘bads’ they want to avoid.14 In working through this empirical 
case study and exploring the practices as they took place, I aim to reveal embedded values and 
ideals as they manifest in practice.  
RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
Through this case study, I aimed to look at situated ethics, ethical dilemmas that occur in practice, 
highlighting how contexts of uncertainty and accountability shape responsibilities in experimental 
practice. The questions I sought to answer were: how do uncertain practices shape truth telling and 
disclosure, and what is the relationship between uncertainty and responsibility? 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
To answer these questions I work through the case of X-Ray Volumetric Imaging (XVI). The present 
paper draws on two research projects at the Sieverts Hospital over a period of three years. Based in 
the United Kingdom, the Sieverts Hospital was installing its first XVI system in 2007. The first 
research project, prior to the XVI installation, involved interviews with staff members conducted 
shortly after the decision had been made to begin a fundraising campaign for the system. The 
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second was an ethnographic, mostly observational, study including observations of the installation 
of the system and what was being done by clinical and non-clinical staff working with it.  
For the interviews, all staff in the department (52) were invited to take part in an interview and 14 
participants were selected from those returning an opt-in slip in order to achieve a cross-sectional 
sample i.e. in order to ensure all grades and levels of experience of participant were represented. 
The sampling method was, therefore, considered to be purposive. 
In the second study, the ethnographic approach focussed on the mundane practices around 
installing and working with the XVI technology, revealing the interplay between machine and 
human. In ‘following the thing’, a name given to the process developed by Marcus,15 the material 
object of the XVI was traced through several different contexts. Therefore, alongside the 
observations of what was being done by clinical and non-clinical staff working with the machine, I 
attended staff meetings and training sessions, I joined the practitioners in coffee breaks and for 
lunch, I conducted presentations of my research for participants and held group discussions with 
those I had observed. In addition I examined documents such as training manuals, protocols, patient 
information leaflets, newsletters, local press and minutes of meetings in order to explore the way 
that these materials shape, and are shaped by, the technologies they are associated with. I spent 
portions of my fieldwork observing the machine when no-one was ‘doing’ anything with it, learning 
how it became part of the establishment through action and non-action. Physically observing the XVI 
revealed only a small aspect of the network; following paperwork in the planning department where 
future treatments were being calculated or discussing doctor-patient consent procedures allowed a 
deeper exploration.  
Throughout the fieldwork observations I took detailed notes, including sketches, which were later 
transcribed in full. Analysis of these transcripts, alongside other sources of relevant fieldwork 
material, entailed an iterative reading and coding to identify conceptual themes of interest.  
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Local NHS Research Ethics Committee to conduct initial, pre-
installation interviews at the Sieverts Hospital. Approval was then obtained from the NHS Main 
Research Ethics Committee (REC 07/Q1308/16) for the ethnographic stages of the project (which 
took place on two sites, although it is just the Sieverts Hospital presented here). Approval was 
sought and granted from local hospital trust Research and Development committees. Written 
consent was obtained from all staff participants for the interviews and from staff who were 
observed as part of the machine installation and early use. The names of staff members and the 
hospitals have been changed to preserve anonymity. 
EMPIRICAL SECTIONS  
X-RAY VOLUMETRIC IMAGING 
X-Ray Volumetric Imaging (XVI) is a type of imaging introduced into radiotherapy treatments in order 
to improve the positioning of radiation beams during targeted cancer treatment. In the context of 
the system described in this paper, the XVI, it involves adapting a radiotherapy treatment machine, 
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or linac, so that the machine can take a Computed Tomography (CT) scan (or Cone Beam, CBCT, 
scan) of a patient prior to delivering a daily dose of radiotherapy. The CT scan images are then 
assessed prior to the patient receiving their treatment to ensure that the treatment radiation will be 
delivered to the correct location within the patient body, avoiding unnecessary treatment of healthy 
tissue. 
KNOWING ABOUT RISKS 
In interviews with staff at the Sieverts Hospital held prior to the introduction of the XVI technology, 
practitioners at the centre of the technological change discussed a lack of evidence, absence of 
proof, a lack of compatibility with existing systems in use, the politics of decision making processes 
and perturbing doubts16 Fuelled by a lack of evidence for the procedure (and an introduction based 
on axiomatic certainty), 17-19 this sceptical perspective was maintained by some during the 
installation phases of the equipment. This is evidenced by the following conversation between Jo 
and Samantha (two senior members of staff in the department): 
Jo is asking Samantha about how they are going to use the XVI once it has been installed. Sam 
answers but says that they are thinking in a very theoretical way “because we don’t know.” … 
Jo says “Then in 20 years we’ll be treating all the secondaries [secondary cancers] from the kV 
imaging!” Sam says she’ll have retired by then and Jo jokes about how the secondary cancers 
will be Sam’s “parting shot”. 
From field notes, 8th October, 2008, p.2 
During the fieldwork over the course of the installation phases, however, these discussions appeared 
to recede. I infrequently, if ever, heard practitioners discuss radiation dose from the CBCT scans 
once they were being used on patients. The extent to which scanning procedures are discussed with 
patients is limited, if discussed at all, as the practice of taking the scans, and hence the associated 
radiation doses, have been ‘normalized’ into the procedures for verifying treatment position, 
showing the limitations of the informed consent procedures. The patients are consented for 
radiotherapy treatment and the risks of that are conveyed, however, any additional doses, or nested 
procedures, a patient may be exposed to are not considered beyond that initial consent procedure. 
Yet the conversation between the two radiographers, Jo and Sam, suggests that things should be 
otherwise. The unknown or speculative risks involved in the procedure, discussed in interviews and 
later in these informal conversations, are not at any stage discussed with the patients. 
It may be the case that those faced with the prospect of treatment might choose the benefit of 
increased life expectancy and accept the risk of a secondary malignancy, a risk suggested by Jo and 
Sam. However, as this is not brought into the discussion with patients they are denied the 
opportunity to address this choice.  
EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS 
Throughout observations at the Sieverts Hospital it became apparent that the introduction of Cone 
Beam CT (CBCT) scanning into the treatment of patients with prostate cancer was experimental, 
with no real consistency or evidence base for the practice. I use the term ‘experimental’ here to 
denote the untried or untested way in way in which patients were exposed to the new procedures 
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with little or no knowledge of outcomes (on both the part of the patients and the practitioners), 
rather than an alternative reading which would suggest patients were part of a controlled 
experiment or ‘trial’ to improve treatment outcomes. Therefore, through the following account I 
highlight how patients were performed as experimental subjects during the introductory stages of 
the X-ray Volumetric Imaging (XVI). Through the following detailed description of the experimental 
patient, including how this role is later derided, I highlight how these practices, whilst being 
accounted for, create incommensurable ideas regarding the use of the system. 
When the Sieverts Hospital began to use the XVI equipment on patients, this was described to me by 
one of the radiographers, Louise, as having “not started using it clinically yet”. Despite this ‘non-
clinical’ use, ten patients were having weekly CBCT scans and weekly, additional, Electronic Portal 
Images (EPI) taken. These EPI images are the traditional images used to verify a patient’s position 
which, at the Sieverts Hospital, involves additional radiation, as an area larger than the treatment 
field is used to acquire the images. On this occasion, the rationale for taking these additional EPI 
images at the same time as CBCT scans was to determine if the displacement of treatment position, 
acquired from the CBCT, was the same as the displacement observed using the traditional system. 
This kind of testing appeared to be reiterating the mechanical quality assurance tests, performed on 
the equipment daily without exposing a ‘real’ patient, used to confirm that the CBCT images and the 
EPI images are congruent. 
Frequently staff in the department told me that they were not going to look at these additional 
images; that they weren’t being “actioned”. Therefore, despite the images being taken prior to the 
radiotherapy treatment being given, no-one was examining them until all the images for each 
patient had been taken, by which time the patients could have finished their course of 30 plus 
treatments over a six or seven week period. This was contrary to the purported benefits of using the 
system where daily CBCT scans are taken and reviewed prior to patients’ treatment enabling 
corrections to be made. Due to the circumstances of patients receiving additional radiation doses 
due to these additional images being taken, this was discussed with radiographers in the 
department.  
We acquired CBCTs and EPIs on ten prostate patients. The results were analysed in 
conjunction with Seb (physicist) and then presented to the clinicians at a protocol review 
meeting. The results were basically used to confirm the XVI bone match results were 
comparable to … EPI’s which provided a level of confidence in a new system and also, 
provided radiographers with experience using the XVI system. 
Personal Communication with Louise, 11th April, 2011 
This ‘trial’, co-ordinated by Louise and analysed with Seb, one of the department’s medical 
physicists, was presented to the clinical oncologists responsible for patients with prostate cancer, 
once the results had been obtained.  
Louise describes the ‘trial’ as providing a level of confidence in the new system and providing 
experience for practitioners in using it. However, it was not described to the patients in this way. 
This can be seen in the patient discourse used when discussing their treatment, as described below.  
The installation of the XVI equipment at the Sieverts Hospital was publicised by the Charity 
responsible for raising funds for its purchase. During the launch of the XVI, in a local newspaper, a 
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patient who was told he would be receiving image guided radiotherapy, the CBCT scans, was 
interviewed. The text from the newspaper read: 
Mr George, 77, of [town] near [district] is one of the first patients to be treated. Mr George is 
being treated for prostate cancer. He said: “My doctor told me that surgery was too 
dangerous at my age, so I have just started this treatment. It is brilliant to know that I am one 
of the first patients to be having the newest cancer fighting treatment and that the radiation 
will just beat the cancer without damaging healthy cells.” 
Taken (and adapted) from the local newspaper April 3rd, 2009.1 
In the newspaper clip Mr George is put into the spotlight by the Charity or the department 
management who collaboratively organised the press event, and, proclaims his thanks and wonder 
relating to being one of the first patients to receive this ‘newest’ treatment. In the act of 
wholeheartedly supporting the new technology, which he believes to be giving him targeted 
treatment ‘just’ to the cancer, he endorses that treatment. 
However, Mr George is one of the ten patients in the trial of the XVI system who is not receiving any 
alteration to his treatment. As such, there is an obvious discrepancy between the rhetoric of ‘not 
being clinical’ indicated by Louise, and “having the newest cancer fighting treatment” as understood 
by Mr. George. 
Later into Mr George’s treatment, this contradiction manifests once more. Mr. George and Mr. Fox, 
both receiving radiotherapy treatment for prostate cancer at the Sieverts Hospital, were routinely 
having their treatment on the XVI adapted linear accelerator, LA6. The two men were both in the 
‘trial’ of the XVI system. One day, when LA6 had broken down, it transpired that these two patients 
chose not to have their treatment on a machine that did not have an XVI attachment, LA3. This 
decision was informed by their belief that they were being treated with the ‘newest’ technology. 
When I was being told about the patients choosing to have their treatment on LA6 rather than LA3 I 
asked the radiographers working on the XVI if the patients were aware the scans were not being 
examined, as the newspaper report suggested Mr. George believed otherwise. 
She [Nikki, a junior radiographer] says most of the patients, like this one (on the bed at the 
moment, not having a scan today) are “just like yeah whatever, do what you want” but there 
are two which “don’t stop going on about it” [Mr. George, quoted above, was one of these 
patients]. Nikki says they sit in the waiting room telling everyone they are having the best 
treatment. She says that last week LA6 broke and they were on LA3 [without the XVI 
capabilities]...but they knew they would get LA6 back by 5:30. Nikki says that these two 
patients said they would wait until 5:30 so they could get the best treatment. I ask Nikki if the 
patients know that no one is actually looking at the scans and she says “yeah, they know 
everything”. 
Monday 11th May 2009, p.4 
                                                          
1 The exact text of this quotation has been changed to protect the identity of the patient and the hospital. The 
meaning remains. 
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The reluctance of these two patients to be treated on the older machine due to them receiving “the 
best treatment” implied to me that they could not know everything. Not only were these patients 
receiving an extra dose of radiation from the additional EPI and CBCT scans, they were not getting 
any of the benefits which the XVI had promised. One of the main advantages put forward by the 
charity appeal was that XVI would provide a more accurate treatment through improving the 
department’s image guided radiotherapy (IGRT) techniques. One of the appeal pamphlets states 
“IGRT allows radiotherapy staff to take CT quality scans during each treatment session, identify 
movement and changes and alter treatment automatically to accommodate for them.” This is what 
we can assume Mr. George thinks he is receiving when he speaks of his treatment just targeting the 
cancer ‘without harming healthy cells’. In practice, however, the treatment is not significantly 
different to that being received by patients who are not being scanned with the XVI technology. 
The framing of the 'trial' as a way of ensuring staff are familiar with the machine, rather than a 
research trial, positions the patients as experimental subjects, rather than research subjects. Had 
this framing of been otherwise, and the patients were 'research subjects' then the Declaration of 
Helsinki would apply 20. This framing raises important questions regarding the validity of consent. 
The patients consented to the treatment procedure (although there is no specific consent for nested 
procedures within the radiotherapy treatment) yet the purpose of the experimental scans was not 
discussed with them, an example of partial truth telling. Another radiographer in that department 
told me she thought that this trial was ‘wrong’; yet this conversation took place well after the event 
and was never publically voiced. There were risks involved in additional scans (as the conversation 
between Jo and Sam demonstrates) however, in routine practice, it is assumed that this risk 
outweighs the benefits of the advances in treatment. Yet, if there is no advancement of treatment 
for these patients, should they not have been informed about the risks? The governance 
requirements of experimental practice and research practice are different and, as such, create 
differing levels of explanation for the patients. Furthermore, the direct patient benefit of 
experimental (staff training) practice versus ‘new’ treatment also differs. The scans taken during the 
experimental practice were no longer a nested treatment procedure for these patients, rather a 
research project that ought to have been consented independently of the treatment.  
DISCUSSION 
This paper is situated in an in-between space: the space between patient and practitioner and the 
temporal space between machine installation and routine practice. Through taking a praxiographic 
approach to ethics and truth telling – that is one that studies things and people in their relations14 - it 
is possible to problemetize ‘truth telling’ in these contexts and consider how patients’ experiences of 
‘new’ treatment can be at odds with ‘experimental’ practices. 
This illustration of situated ethics highlights the way in which practitioners inhabit the ‘technological 
frontier’ of the ‘risk society.’21 In the process of stabilizing a technology into practice, the uncertainty 
and diversity of possible futures becomes forgotten, or ‘black boxed’, as demonstrated by the 
absence of talk about risk or dose, once CBCT scanning was fixed in treatment routines. Whether the 
practitioners accept the risks associated with these technologies or they choose to overlook them is 
unclear. However, what results is an absence of truth telling within practices of acquiescence to the 
purported value of the installation.  
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The case of introducing image guided radiotherapy technologies into practice could be considered a 
site where potential uses of the technology have taken precedence over knowledge about their 
associated risks. This decadent technology22 was promoted as the latest and best system for 
improving the accuracy of radiotherapy treatment. Despite the lack of knowledge about the 
increased dose from additional cone beam CT scans, the risk was classified as inevitable or, at least, 
someone else’s responsibility. Doubts were neither formalised nor well researched and, as such, 
there were no ‘facts’ on risk to share with patients.  
When it comes to applying the XVI system into practice, it appears that those actors developing 
techniques for usage, advancing technological practice, stop thinking in terms of risk and prioritize 
application. When practice takes over, the act of using the systems takes precedence. Issues such as 
protocol development, accidental injury and case load management are considered relevant and 
hence become associated with the technology, leaving those initial risky decisions considered closed 
and hence not up for discussion with the patient.  
We see from the presentation of this ethnographic material that the actions of the patients were at 
odds with the ‘experimental’ nature of the new system. In positively connecting with the trial and 
their treatment with the XVI, the patients provided practitioners with an opportunity to reaffirm 
their accountability. The choice of Mr George and Mr Fox to wait for their treatment involving the 
CBCT scan, validated the actions of practitioners in performing the scan through displaying their 
choice to receive the ‘newest’ treatment.  
In this sense, as Charis Cussins suggests, the patients maintain influence on their healthcare 
treatments by making decisions about them, resulting in patients being neither a victim nor helpless 
in this process.23 Contrary to Cussins’ work on fertility treatment however, the patients in the 
present research, those invoking the right to be treated on what they perceive as superior 
machinery, are making decisions situated in the context of ‘life saving treatment’ and, as such, the 
context of different life goals than those of fertility treatment. Furthermore, these decisions are 
founded on incomplete knowledge. 
It seemed absurd to Nikki that the patients would wait to have their treatment on the LA6 machine 
but, for Mr. George, it could be interpreted as a means through which he can maintain control of his 
treatment and his cancer. Through applying his partial and constructed knowledge of the benefits of 
the ‘new’ treatment, he is able to make a decision about his treatment. The performances of the 
patient – those who, according to Nikki, are passive in letting the radiographers do what they want 
or those who actively participate in the decisions about their treatment – are influenced by their 
interpretation of the (partial) information regarding the CBCT scans. Their capacity for action was 
therefore located within the confines of the knowledge they have received from the radiographers 
and various other sources, for example the charity funding the machine installation. Patient actions 
are therefore shaped by the level of understanding they are enabled to obtain and practitioners 
directed the actions of the patients through maintaining these partial levels of understanding. Such 
partial truth telling created order and justification for practitioners’ own practices. By not correcting 
what aspects of ‘new’ treatment they were getting, practitioners ensured the patients remained 
engaged whilst being protected from any suggestion that what they are doing was questionable. The 
radiographers also make an implicit deferral to the authority of the patient’s consultant as, under 
the regulatory framework of exposing patients to radiation,24 responsibility for obtaining informed 
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consent for the radiotherapy procedure and responsibility for the patient’s exposure, ultimately lies 
with the  consultant.  
The patients had no formal sources of information regarding this trial. They consented for 
radiotherapy treatment, the risks of which were explained by the consultant, and they were told 
they were being treated on the machine with the new ‘life saving’ technology. Through the process 
of partial truth telling relating to the potential benefits of the system, Mr. George was transformed 
into a patient who wanted to be treated on that system. In not receiving information about the 
nature of the scans, he maintained this position (although that is not necessarily to say he would 
decide not to receive the scans should he be informed differently). Following Lignou and Edwards 8 
“the fact that a researcher has manipulated a potential subject’s decision does not in and of itself 
make it morally problematic”. However, as they elaborate, what is of moral concern is what the 
researcher intends to achieve by manipulating the information presented to a patient. Whilst there 
may be no legal issues with the validity of the consent for radiotherapy, there is a moral question 
regarding the validity of consent for nested procedures, for example the image guided radiotherapy 
process. 
In the case study I have presented here, partial truth telling to patients created multiple patient 
positions, exemplified by both those who let the radiographers ‘do what they want’ and those who 
‘don’t stop going on about it’, and thus also facilitated support for the use of the XVI. This 
legitimated the actions of the radiographers involved in the trial of the XVI with the ten patients. 
Nikki says, “Yeah, they know everything”, suggesting that the patients were given all possible 
information and therefore made an informed decision, justifying the radiographers’ practices in this 
instance.  
Through the multiple actions from patients, radiographers and the XVI, the role of the XVI as 
‘innovative’ and ‘best’ was accounted for. However, in the case of these patients, there was no 
therapeutic benefit and hence the involvement of the charity, and associated rhetoric, heightened 
the therapeutic potential of the system being introduced. It may be that these patients were fully 
informed about the trial of the XVI technology however the statement in the newspaper and their 
actions regarding waiting for treatment on the ‘newest’ machine suggest otherwise. The case study 
presents a case where ‘informed consent’ was invalid as, in essence, the subjects have been 
deceived. The fact that the patients appear to fully agree to the study does not actually grant the 
practitioners authority to perform the intervention.  
Surbone 7 argues that a preoccupation with autonomy and partnership leads to the application of 
rules of reciprocity that do not capture the essence of the patient-doctor partnership: a dynamic, 
asymmetrical relation with unequal knowledge and power. The patient looks to the practitioner, 
they invest in medical authority as a result of the consent to treatment and all that it involves. In 
order to deliver the radiotherapy in line with the CBCT imaging protocols, the practitioner accepts 
that someone, if not them, has evaluated the risk and it is acceptable. 
AUTHOR’S REFLECTION 
Uncovering the circumstances of the experimental practice and the partial understanding of the 
patients placed me in a very difficult situation. It was not plausible to consider discussing this with 
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the patients involved and therefore all I could do was, to the best of my ability, raise this with other 
practitioners in the department. Asking questions such as, “do the patients know?” “what do you 
think about…?” As I have indicated in the main text, my position was either refuted, “They know 
everything”, or it was confirmed but only in private. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have presented the case of experimental subjects during the introduction of X-ray 
Volumetric Imaging (XVI) in radiotherapy treatment practices. The aim of the paper was to look at 
situated ethics to highlight how contexts of uncertainty and accountability shape responsibilities in 
experimental practice to answer the questions: how do uncertain practices shape truth telling and 
disclosure, and what is the relationship between uncertainty and  responsibility? 
As the case demonstrates, truth telling in experimental practices is not a reiteration of well-
established debates concerning informed consent for treatment. Rather it is an example of 
practitioners legitimizing action with new technological systems through managing their uncertainty. 
Routinely, there would be no informed consent for the procedure of localisation or imaging nested 
within the wider context of radiotherapy treatment. However, in the experimental practice 
described, the ethical obligation of disclosure was marginalised. The case shows how the dynamic 
and interactive process of truth telling was destabilised by uncertainty. The practitioners removed 
themselves from taking responsibility for telling the truth to patients in order to work with, or ‘park’, 
any uncertainty relating to their duties and, therefore, continue to practice.  
The patients’ partial understanding of the practices they were being exposed to and the 
practitioners’ partial understanding relating to the risks of the system, created incommensurable 
ideas regarding the use of the system. By maintaining partial truth telling and not clarifying exactly 
what the degree of knowledge the patient had about the system, for example ‘the patients know 
what is happening’, practitioners worked to account for their actions and formed boundaries around 
their actions in order for those actions to make sense to them. As such, patients’ experiences of 
‘new’ treatment can be considered at odds with ‘experimental’ practice. This has wide reaching 
implications for practice. By making uncertainty visible and present in discussions with patients a 
more open and responsible practice would surely follow. On-going, forward and backward looking 
reflection would shape services in a way which would be accountable to those who will be affected 
by outcomes. 
An inherent weakness with the project was the lack of patient voice in the data collection. Further 
research should aim to include the patient whilst remaining sensitive to how uncertainty is discussed 
and hence revealed. 
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